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1. Critique of Realism
Introduction
The doctrine of fl/aja-consciousness (yijnOna) is a theory which ac­
counts for the formation of mental images without dependence on ex­
ternal objects. “Alaya” is a derivative of the verb “Q-tl” which means 
“settle down upon” or “abide in” something and connotes a “dwell­
ing,” “receptacle” or “storehouse.” For example, “Himalaya” means 
“storehouse of snow.” The d/oya-consciousness is said to be a 
storehouse in which the residual force (y asana) of all previous ex­
periences has been stored up as latent impressions. The Vijfianavada 
theory is that an image appears when the latent residual force of ex­
perience is actualized, and that this image is not formed by the cogni­
tion of an external object. This theory makes clear that empirical cogni­
tion is karmic and stresses the need to find an absolute knowledge 
which transcends the level of empirical cognition. This Vijfianavada 
theory, which denies the existence of external entities as objects of 
cognition, naturally invites the opposition of all schools which took a 
realist position. In responding to that opposition and criticizing 
realism, the Vijfianavada thinkers firmly established their own represen-
• The essay translated here appeared originally as a chapter in the book, Ninshiki to 
chOetsu: Yuishiki (Cognition and Transcendence: Consciousness-Only) (1970) written 
by Hattori Masaaki and Ueyama Shunpei. Carl Bielefeldt assisted in the translation. 
All footnotes have been added by the translator.
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tationalist epistomolgy. In the philosophical tradition of Abhidharma, 
they developed extremely subtle theories with regard to the problems 
raised in epistemology.
A criticism of realism is to be found in a coherent form in the Vim-■
satika.' It is believed that Vasubandhu, after criticizing the various 
theories of realism in this small work, then wrote the Trimdika* which 
expounds the theory of “the transformation of consciousness” (vi- 
jnana-parinOma). This dispute between the VijnSnavadins and the 
various schools of realism was repeated again and again in later 
periods, but the main points of the dispute can already be seen in 
Vasubandhu’s exposition in the Vimsatika. Subsequently, Dignaga 
wrote the Alambanaparlkso* in which he clarified the necessary condi­
tions of an object of cognition, based on Vasubandhu’s explanations. 
He also criticized realism from the same perspective, providing the 
basis for Vijnanavada epistemology. The theory that he expounds in 
this text became the basis for all later philosophical discussions concern­
ing the object of cognition. In the following discussion, I will use these 
two works in order to clarify the nature of Vijfianavida epistemology.
Four Questions and Responses
In the beginning of the Vimsatika, Vasubandhu quotes this passage 
from the Hua Yen Sutra (DasabhQmika Section, T. 278). “Oh 
Jinaputra (Sons of the Buddha), in reality the Triple World is Mind- 
Only,” and then expounds the Vijfianavada theory that all the things 
of this world, like the net-shaped hairs that appear in the illusion of 
a man suffering from a vision disorder, are unreal, and exist only as 
images. Four questions are raised by the opponents of this theory.
1 The Sanskrit version of the Vimfatika (Twenty Verses) of Vasubandhu was edited 
and translated into French by Sylvain L£vi, VijfiaptimatratOsiddhi. Deux traitds de 
Vasubandhu: Vimfatika (la Vingtaine) accompagnte d’une explication en prose, et 
Trim&ka (la Tremaine) avec le commentaire de Sthiramati, Paris, 1925. It was 
translated into Chinese several times, most notably by Hsiian-tsang in 661. It’s Chinese 
title is Wei shih erh shih lun (T. 1590).
2 The TrimJika (Thirty Verses). See note 1. Translated by Hsiian-tsang in 648 as Wei 
shih san shih lun sung. T. 1586.
3 The Alambanapariksa (Examination of Objects of Cognition). Translated into 
Chinese by Hsiian-tsang in 657 as Kuan suo yuan yuan lun. T. 1624.
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If external objects are not real, and images result from the residual 
force of experience which is latent in the mind, then:
(1) Why is it that the image of a certain thing occurs only in a 
specific place and not anywhere?
(2) Moreover, why does the image in that place occur only at a 
specific time, and not at any time?
(3) The illusion of a non-existent hair occurs only for the person 
with a visual disorder, and not for other people. In contrast, 
the image of a given thing does not occur for only one person, 
but occurs in the minds of all the people who are in the same 
place and time. How is this explained?
(4) Such things as appear in the illusion of a person with a vision 
disorder and as are seen in a dream do not, in fact, have 
efficacy. If, in a dream, one is bitten by a snake or injured by a 
weapon, it would not be the case that, on waking, poison is cir­
culating in the body or that a scar remains. However, what is 
presented as images when one is awake actually achieves 
efficacy. How are these things to be explained?
Vasubandhu answers these objections in the following manner: 
(1, 2) The fact that images occur within the limits of space and 
time does not necessarily presuppose the fact that what is 
presented as images really exists in an external world. This is 
because in a dream, although there is no real object, such im­
ages as a flower garden, a man, or a woman, are seen only in a 
certain specific place. Moreover, they are not seen at any time in 
that place, but only at a certain specific time.
(3) All those who have fallen into the state of ravenous ghosts 
as a result of deeds done in a previous existence, when facing a 
river flowing with pure water, together embrace the image of a 
river filled with pus, urine and excrement, and of the existence 
of watchmen, who are not actually there, on guard with cudgels 
and swords in their hands. Consequently, just because an image 
occurs in the minds of more than one person, there is no reason 
to admit the existence of objects in the external world.
(4) Wet dreams occur as a result of sexual intercourse experienc­
ed in a dream; which is to say that even non-existent things do, 
in fact, achieve efficacy.
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Vasubandhu goes on to explain all four of these points using the 
following hell simile. Sinners who have fallen into hell see such things 
as those who inflict punishment on them, and see iron mountains 
which press in to crush them. Moreover, not just one, but all persons 
see these things. Thus, although such things as tormentors do not really 
exist, the sinners in hell are actually made to suffer.
The Sarvastivadins believe that the demons, etc., are real, but this 
cannot be said to be a valid opinion because the demons do not feel the 
torments inflicted on the sinners. On the other hand, the Sautrantikas 
regard the demons, etc., as no more than subjective images, but they 
do not completely deny the reality of those images as do the 
Vijflanavadins. They say this is because the sinners in hell produce cer­
tain kinds of material elements by means of the remaining force of 
deeds committed in the past, and these cause images of cudgel-wielding 
demons and groves of iron trees which torment sinners with their 
thorns. In his criticism of the Sautrantika view Vasubandhu leads us 
into the Vijfianavada theory which is as follows. The latent residual 
force of action permeates the stream of consciousness of the actor and 
does not exist outside of that stream. Consequently, instead of 
hypothesizing that the residual force produces material elements out­
side of the mind, it is more valid to think that when this residual force 
becomes actual, and a specific transformation occurs in the stream of 
consciousness, images of demons, etc. appear.
If we assume that images produced in the mind are things that arise 
from specific transformations of the stream of consciousness, and that 
objects which produce images do not really exist in an external world, 
then our daily experiences can be compared to a dream. Vasubandhu 
does, in fact, use the simile of a dream in replying to the questions 
raised by his critics. The Vijfianavada thinkers after him also recogniz­
ed that the dream consciousness that sees unreal objects was an apt 
simile and made repeated use of it.
However, it might be objected that because the objects seen in a 
dream disappear when we are awake, we know clearly that they are not 
real. It might also be objected that we do not experience objects seen 
when we are awake in the same way we experience dream objects.
Responding to these questions, Vasubandhu says, “A person who is 
not yet awake does not realize the fact that the objects seen in a dream 
are not real.” A dreaming person does not know that the objects that 
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appear in his own consciousness do not actually exist. The daily ex­
perience of the people of the world is also the same. Because people 
have continued to hold, from past lives, the mistaken conception that 
external objects exist, they fall into the deep sleep of that latent 
residual force and do not realize that such objects do not, in fact, exist. 
However, when our knowledge of the mundane world has been 
purified through the eye-opening attainment of an imageless transmun- 
dane knowledge which counteracts the latent residual force, we awaken 
to the fact that the object does not really exist.
Vasubandhu’s response clearly reveals that VijnSnavida philosophy 
has as its basic theme the awakening from dreamlike empirical cogni­
tion and the attainment of transmundane knowledge. The fact that em­
pirical cognition is common to all people does not mean that such 
cognition is correct; it means no more than that people have the same 
dream because of similar karma in former lives. It was not the purpose 
of the Vijfi&iavada thinkers to inquire into the grounds of empirical 
cognition, given the fundamental fact that such cognition is character­
ized by a universal consensus. They understood all of empirical cogni­
tion as karma, and concertedly focused on finding a position which 
transcended karma. The analogy of dreams, ravenous ghosts and hell 
points to a position that transcends the level of the realists’ discussion 
of the structure of cognition. However, subordinating this religious 
aspect within their argument, the VijfianavSda school stood on the 
same level as the realists and pursued the investigation of 
epistemological problems.
Three Types of Realism
In the VimsatikO, Vasubandhu divided the theories that the object of 
cognition actually exists in the external world into three types. These 
theories are first divided into two types depending on whether the exter­
nally existent object of cognition is understood as a composite body 
formed from various parts, such as a jar which is made up of a neck, 
main body and foot, or whether it was understood as a unitary thing. If 
we push to its logical conclusion the position in which a single material 
body is understood as a composite body, by repeatedly dividing the 
various parts that make up the composite body into their respective 
parts until the dividing is carried to its limit, we will arrive at the atom 
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(paramQnu). In the case in which numerous atoms are recognized as 
composing a single composite body, there are two more theories, de­
pending on the way in which the atoms are arranged. Thus Vasuban- 
dhu presents the following three theories. That which is believed to ex­
ist externally as an object of cognition is one of the following:
(1) a unitary thing such as the whole hypothesized by the Vai$e$ika, 
or
(2) a collection of atoms which have not congealed, and thus have 
spaces between them, as viewed by the Sarvastivadins, or
(3) a thing that has achieved a single, coarse form, not apparent in a 
unitary atom, many atoms having assembled without spaces, as in 
the Sautrantika theory.
Through successive refutation of these three types of realism Vasuban- 
dhu establishes the Vijfianavada theory. The important points of his 
critique of realism are as follows:
(1) A unitary thing does not exist anywhere as a whole distinct from 
its various parts.
(2) Since, without spatial extension, individual atoms would not be 
cognizable, then even if many came together, they still could not 
become an object of cognition.
(3) Since it is not possible to demonstrate the fact that the atom is a 
single substance, it also could not be demonstrated that the 
numerous atoms which have come together comprise an aggrega­
tion with a coarse form.
Vaisesika Realism•
The theory of the Vaisesika and their offshoot, the Nyftya school, is 
that the whole which is composed of many parts exists as a unitary enti­
ty, distinct from its parts. For example, a cloth exists as something 
different from the threads which make it up, and a jar exists as a 
unitary substance different from the two bowl-shaped pieces frofn 
which it is made. The cloth and the jar are considered not to be simply 
a combination of the respective material causes, but to exist as 
something newly created from, and independent of, the combination 
of these causes.
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This Nyiya-VaiSesika doctrine runs counter to the Buddhist position 
that all entities are the combination of various factors. Nigirjuna 
criticized this NySya view in his Vaidalya-prakaranaf where he argued 
that the whole does not exist separate from the parts. Vasubandhu’s 
denial of the whole follows Nagarjuna’s argument. It is on this ques­
tion of the whole and the parts that we can clearly see the difference be­
tween the Buddhist and the realist views of reality.
The Nyiya-VaiSesika believed that concepts and the words which 
signify them are all real things. In technical terms these are called the 
“padartha" (word-meaning) where "artha" is the externally existent 
referent of words. For example, corresponding to the word “cow,” 
there exists a substance (dravya), cow, and corresponding to words 
such as “white” or “walking” attributed to that cow, are the real quali­
ty (gun a), white (color), and the real activity (karma), walking. Fur­
ther, since “cow” can be used to refer to white cows or spotted cows, 
standing cows or walking cows, there also exists as its referent a cow- 
in-general—that is, universality (sOmOnya) which makes all cows cows. 
At the same time, there also exists particularity (vtfesa) to distinguish 
the referent of “cow” from horses, etc. Because white (color) and walk­
ing, universality and particularity are combined with the substance in 
an inseparable relationship, this relationship also exists, and is called 
"inherence" (samavOya). Hence, the judgment, “this cow is white” 
corresponds to a real state in which the quality referred to by “white” 
inheres in the substance referred to by “cow.”
In this way, the Vai&esika divide what exists as “word referents” 
into six categories: substance, quality, action, universality, particulari­
ty, and inherence (or necessary relation). These six are given in the 
Vaisesika-sUtraf* which outlines the school’s system. Whereas these six 
all correspond to positive concepts, a seventh category of “non-ex­
istence" (abhOva) was added in later times to correspond to negative 
concepts. So, for example, the sentence, “The cow is not in the cow­
shed,” refers to the non-existence in the cowshed of the cow; and 
the sentence, “The cow is not a horse,” refers to the non-existence in 
the horse of the cow.
4 The Vaidalya-prakarana exists only in Tibetan, edited by Kajiyama YOichi, 
Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia, Nos. 6-7 (1965), pp. 129-155.
5 There is an English translation of this text, The Vatfesika SOtras of KanQda, by 
Nandalal Sinha, Allahabad 1923 (Sacred Books of the Hindus, VI).
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Needless to say, among these 4‘word referents” it is substance which 
occupies the central place: the others exist as factors inhering in and 
limiting the substance. There is no white color independent of 
something such as a cow or a piece of cloth. Neither is there any walk­
ing which does not inhere in some substance. Substance too, however, 
does not exist as pure substance. It always exists determined by its 
qualities, etc.: a cow is white, black or some other color; it is walking, 
standing, etc. As mentioned earlier, the word “cow” refers to a corre­
sponding substance, cow. But while the word or concept “cow” can 
refer to all cows, the substance we cognize is always some particular 
cow, and not cows in general. Buddhists, therefore, argue that “cow” 
is a general concept constructed by the subject through the operation 
of abstraction from a plurality of individuals; it does not correspond to 
any real entity. The Vaifesika position, however, is that the universal, 
cowness, which makes all the particular substances, cows, exists in­
dependently of the subject. And it is because the substance is deter­
mined by this universal that we grasp it as a cow. This individual 
substance restricted by the cowness is also determined by qualities, ac­
tions, and the other categories.
6 The PadOrthadharmasamgraha of Prafastaptida, tr. by Ganganatha Jha, 
Allahabad 1911 (Reprint from Pandit).
Substance
According to the VaiSesika theory, then, the object of our cognition 
is the substance as determined by the various other categories; the 
cognition of quality, actions, and so on always presupposes the cogni­
tion of some substance. Since what is cognized is a “word referent,” 
we can express it through language. Words, according to the Vaitesika 
(theoreticians), are signs established by the ancients to transmit 
concepts derived from the cognition of entities. Pra£astap£da (sixth 
century) in his systematic treatise on VaiSesika, PadOrthadharma- 
samgrahaf says that reality has three aspects: existing, being ver­
bally expressed, and being the object of cognition; in the VaiSesika 
system these three are essentially indistinguishable. What exists is what 
is expressed by language, and language expresses what is perceived.
The perceived substance is expressed by words such as “cow,” 6
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“cloth,” and “jar.” The substance directly cognized is simply “this,” 
but, because at the same time we also cognize the determining univer­
sal, cowness, “this” becomes perceived and expressed as “something 
possessing the cowness”—i.e., as “cow.” Similarly, because we 
simultaneously cognize the determinant of quality and action, “this” 
becomes perceived as “a white cow” or as “ a walking cow,” and can 
be expressed in sentences such as, “This cow is white,” or “This cow is 
walking.” One substance can also serve as a limiting factor for another 
substance. For example, the expressions, “This cow has a horn,” or 
“He has a stick,” are based on the cognition of a cow determined by a 
horn or of a man determined by a stick.
The VaiSesika divide substances (dravya) into nine types: earth (pr- 
thivt), water (ja/a), fire (tejas), air (vdyu), ether (fftofo), space (dik)> 
time (kola)' soul (St man), and mind (man as). These substances, 
moreover, are divided into those which are made up of a plurality of 
elements and those which are not. Substances that are not composed of 
elements are the five from ether on and the individual atoms of earth, 
water, fire, and air.7 When these atoms combine they make new 
substances which are separate, individual entities, possessing their own 
existence, and capable of being expressed by their own specific terms. 
Thus, atoms are called “causal substances” and the entities produced 
by their combination are called “resultant substances.” Moreover, 
those “resultant substances” themselves can combine to produce 
new substances. Thus, independent of the torso, legs, tail, etc. there 
exists the substance, cow, and independent of the threads there exists 
the substance, cloth. The referents of the words “cow” or “cloth” 
exists as an individual whole separate from their respective parts.
7 According to Vai&esika theory, the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air are im­
perceptible particles and only become perceptible substances when they combine in 
great numbers with each other. The other five substances are unitary and impercepti­
ble.
8 Uddyotakara lived around the second half of 6th century and was the author of 
the NyOyavOrttika, a commentary on VatsyAyana’s NyOyabhQsya.
Uddyotakara8 gives the following argument for the reality of the 
whole. If the whole is not something other than the sum of the parts, 
and does not have its own existence different from these parts, then we 
could not perceive, for example, a tree in the garden as a “tree.” What 
we actually cognize is only the part of the tree facing us; we do not
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cognize the other side or the interior of the tree. Nevertheless, we can 
perceive as a “tree” the object of our cognition. The reason for this is 
that the whole, “tree,” is present in the part we cognize. He also gives 
the following examples. If we pull one part of a cloth, we pull the 
whole cloth; if we hold one part of a jar, we hold the whole jar. This 
would not be possible if the cloth and jar were only the sum of their 
parts. If we pull or lift one part of a pile of dust, for example, we do 
not thereby pull or lift the whole. Thus, we see the “cloth” and “jar” 
are present in the parts as separate single wholes.
Substance Does Not Exist
In opposition to the VaiSesika’s viewpoint that concepts and words 
all correspond to reality, Buddhists are of the opinion that what is 
expressed by words is not real and that words are only signs made for 
the purpose of daily functioning. What we express by a word such as 
“cow” or “man” is no more than a temporary collection of various 
elements which does not have existence as a thing in itself. From the 
beginning, Buddhists took the position that human existence was an ag­
gregation of five types of physical and mental elements (the five skan- 
dhas), and denied any human substance outside of these elements. The 
aggregation of elements, changing its aspect moment after moment, 
forms a stream. Eventually the collected elements disperse. There is no 
human existing as the substance corresponding to any such name.
In The Questions of King Milinda, a dialogue between the Bactrian 
king, Menander, and the Buddhist monk, NSgasena, there is a passage 
in which Nagasena employs a skillful simile to show that the substance, 
man, does not exist. To the King’s question, “What, Sir, is your 
name?” NSgasena replies that as far as people of the world are con­
cerned, he is NSgasena, but that “Nigasena” is merely an appellation, 
and there is no personal substance corresponding to it. The king is 
doubtful and raises the objection that if there is no personal substance, 
then there is no one who controls his conduct, no one who devotes 
himself to spiritual cultivation, no one who experiences the holy state; 
and there is no one who kills, steals, or commits any other of the Five 
Major Transgressions. The consequence of such a position is, 
therefore, a complete denial of good and evil deeds, as well as the fruit 
of such deeds. Then, thinking that without some entity to which it refer­
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red there could be no name, the King inquired to what entity the name 
“Nagasena” has been given: is it the hair of the head? the hair of the 
body? ... the skin? ... the flesh? ... the nerves? ... the bones? ... 
the heart? .. . the liver? ... blood? ... the brain? is it all of these com­
bined? is it something other than these? In response to these questions, 
Nagasena, taking the chariot in which the king has come as an exam­
ple, now questions the King.9
9 The English translation here is after T.W. Rhys Davids, tr. The Questions of King 
Milinda, Part I (N.Y., 1963), pp. 43-44, with changes.
“Then if you came, Sire, in a carriage, explain to me what that is. Is 
it the pole that is the chariot?”
“I did not say that.”
“Is it the axle that is the chariot?”
“Certainly not.”
“Is it the wheels, or the framework, or the ropes, or the yoke, or the 
spokes of the wheels, or the goad, that are the chariot?”
And to all these he still answered no.
“Then is it all these parts of it that are the chariot?”
“No, Sir.”
“But is there anything outside them that is the chariot?”
And still he answered no.
“Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot. Chariot is a 
mere empty sound. What then is the chariot you say you came in? It 
is a falsehood that your majesty has spoken, an untruth! There is no 
such thing as a chariot!”
In this way, the king who had intended to press NSgasena with his 
questions is himself pressed by the same questions, and in the end, ar­
rives at the position Nagasena had wanted to take.
“I have spoken no untruth, reverend Sir. It is on account of its hav­
ing all these things—the pole, and the axle, the wheels, and the 
framework, the ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad—that it 
comes under the generally understood term, the designation in com­
mon use, of ‘chariot.’ ”
“Very good! Your Majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of 
‘chariot.’ And just even so it is on account of all those things you 
questioned me about—the thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a 
human body, and the five constituent elements of being—that I come 
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under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, 
of ‘Nagasena.’ ”
This simile is quite famous, and is found in the Samyuttanikaya.x<* 
Candraklrti too, in his commentary to the MadhyamakakOrikH,u uses 
this simile of the chariot to explain the concept of “dependent origina­
tion,” in which all things exist only in relation to others, and do not 
possess own-being.
The SarvOstivada View
The Buddhist theory that a thing that is made up of many com­
ponents is only tentatively referred to by a single name, and that no 
substance corresponding to names exists clearly differs from the VaiSe- 
sika view that there is a unitary whole separate from its composite 
parts and indicated by a word. Yet, even if we accept as non-existent 
the thing which is given a name, can’t we assume that the components 
really exist? Even if there is no such substance as a chariot, do not the 
shafts, axles, and wheels which compose it exist? If we take it that even 
they exist as something in name only, and are not real, what ultimately 
exists? The answer to such questions is layed out in the philosophical 
system of the Abhidharma.
The Sarvastivadins recognize as ultimate entities 75 kinds of 
elements (dharmas), divided into five groups: material entities (rQpa), 
thought (citta), thought functions (mentals, caitasika), things disso­
ciated from thought (citta-viprayuktasamskOra), and unconditioned 
things (asamskrta). They are not something produced from other 
elements, nor can they be changed by other elements, nor are they 
things which ever loose their own inherent characteristic. For example, 
fire, a primary element, exists independently of other elements, does 
not loose its own homogenous nature, and has the inherent 
characteristics of heat. Water in a pot placed on a stove becomes hot,
10 Edited and published by the Pali Text Society in 5 volumes. T. 99 is a Chinese 
translation of the Sarvastivada version.
11 The MadhyamakakQrikQ of Nagarjuna (second century C.E.) exists in a Sanskrit 
edition edited by De La Vallee Poussin (St.-P6tersbourg, 1903-13, Bibliotheca Bud- 
dhica, IV) and chapters 1 and 25 were translated into English by Stcherbatsky (Le­
ningrad, 1927). The Chinese translation is in T. 1564. Candraklrti’s (c. 600 C.E.) 
commentary, the PrasannapadQ, is included in the edition and translation above. 
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and a hot wind blows on a burning desert, but the water’s heat and the 
wind’s heat are something imparted by the fire of the stove and the sun, 
and if those conditions should cease to exist the heat is lost. Conse­
quently in both the wind and the water heat is not an inherent 
characteristic. On the other hand, the heat of fire is never lost under 
any conditions. The primary element of fire which possesses heat is an 
ultimately existent element.
There seems to have been a problem about whether the number of 
ultimately existent elements counted by the Sarvastivadins is seventy- 
five or not, but the various treatises of this school are united on the 
point of making of material entities eleven types. The eleven types are 
the five organs of cognition (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body-organ of 
touch awareness), the five objects of these organs (color-shape, sound, 
odor, taste, and tactile sense data) as well as unmanifested form. The 
cognitive organs of eye and ear, etc. are said to be a kind of matter that 
is translucent and invisible, having the function of seeing and hearing, 
etc., and are called special transformations of the primary elements 
(bhfltavikdravi&esa), earth, water, fire, and air. Whereas we would 
regard these cognitive organs to be distinct from the visible bodily 
organs, such as the eyeball and ear orifice, within which they reside, the 
Sarvastivadins considered them to be special material organs in their 
own right. The unmanifested form is the potential force remaining 
after the bodily activity which was manifested as form, and the poten­
tial force remaining after the function of words which were manifested 
as sound; it is a material substance which is invisible and which does 
not vie with other elements.
The five kinds of objects, other than the four primary elements 
themselves, are all made from the primary elements. Thus, we must 
first take note of the distinctive view of the Sarvastivadins concerning 
the primary elements. According to the Abhidharmakoia-bhQsya 
(dhatu-nirdesa),n the primary elements are earth, water, fire, and air, 
but they, being included under tactile sense data (tangibles) within the 
five kinds of objects, are not deemed to be color-shape (rQpa), Earth is
12 The Abhidharmakofa-bhnsya is Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Sarvistivlda 
Abhidharma, written before his Vijftflnavada conversion. The Sanskrit text has been 
edited by Pradhan (Patna 1967, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, VIII) and the Chinese 
translation is contained in T. 1558-60.
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hardness, not a hard thing. Water is dampness, not a damp thing. 
Similarly, fire is warmth and wind is motion. Here the primary 
elements are not being thought of a material causes of concrete matter, 
but as characteristics possessed by substances.
In the earlier texts, earth is clearly revealed to be a hard substance. If 
we consider this hard substance in terms of the human body, it is hair, 
nails, teeth, etc., and in terms of the external world, rocks, tiles and 
pebbles, etc. Water in people is sweat, tears, urine, etc., and again in 
the external world, such things as rain and dew, or wine and milk. 
However, in the MahQvibhQsd™ there gradually arises the tendency to 
abstract from these concrete substances those tangible properties which 
they possess, namely, hardness, dampness, etc., and it is here that the 
interpretation of the four primary elements are hardness, dampness, 
warmth, and motion clearly appears.
This tendency of Sarvastivida to abstract things is seen in its inter­
pretation of the four primary elements, as well in its interpretation of 
the five kinds of objects. Color-shape (rQpa) is divided into color as 
such (yarna), and form (samsthdnaY, the former are of four types, 
blue, yellow, red, and white, to which is added shadow, light, 
brightness, darkness, cloudiness, smokiness, dustiness, and fogginess, 
making twelve types altogether; the latter (shape) is of eight types, 
long, short, square, round, convex, concave, straight, and crooked. 
Sound, smell, and taste are divided into eight, four, and six types re­
spectively. Tactile sense data totals eleven types since, besides the four 
primary elements, there are seven types, such as smoothness and 
roughness. The colors blue, yellow, etc., the forms, long, short, 
square, round, etc., sound, smell, taste, and tactile sense data are at­
tributes of matter, and are not to be thought of as material entities in 
themselves. A blue thing, a round thing, or a thing that makes a sound 
has a definite mass and exists as impenetrable (sa-pratigha) matter, oc­
cupying a space corresponding to its mass, but it is difficult for us to 
conceive of a blue color, a round shape, an emitted sound, etc. existing
13 The MahOvibhOsO (Chinese, T. 1545-7) by Kfltyftyanlputra is a commentary on the 
JUOnaprasthana (Chinese, T. 1543-4) by Pftriva and Vasumitra II. The JriOnaprasthOna 
is the earliest known Sarvftstivdda Abhidharma text. Both exist in Chinese only, 
though the earlier text has been reconstructed in Sanskrit from the Chinese by &lnti 
Bhiksu (Santinketan, 1955).
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as such matter. They are attributes of matter, grasped by the functions 
of seeing and hearing. The Sarvastivadins, taking an epistemological 
point of view, abstracted from concrete matter the attributes corre­
sponding to each of the cognitive functions of the subject, and con­
sidered these to be material entities. In this way, concrete matter is 
analyzed into color and form, etc., down through tactile sense data.
Atom Theory
If we carry to its logical conclusion the Sarvastivada theory which 
analyzes material existence into elements such as color and shape, etc., 
then the fact that matter has spatial extension becomes inexplicable. If 
we assume that color and shape, themselves, have extention, then there 
couldn’t be any shape where there is color, and in the space occupied 
by shape, there would be no room for tactile sense data to enter. It 
would be impossible to appreciate a celadon porcelain jar’s feeling of 
smoothness while enjoying its color. However, the Sarvastivadins did 
not carry their logic to the point of denying that matter is extended. 
They did think of material entities as having spatial extension. It is in 
their atom theory that this way of thinking can be seen.
All material entities are aggregation of atoms (param Gnu). The four 
primary elements are no exception to this. The individual atom has no 
extension, but atoms do not exist alone; even the particles of dust 
floating in the sun’s rays which shine through a window are “assem­
bled atoms” and have extension. Atoms are not homogeneous. The 
atoms of earth, water, fire, and wind each differ in substance. Colors 
and shapes, etc. are things made up of the four primary elements, and 
colors are thought to be collections of color atoms and shapes collec­
tions of shape atoms. Thus, when something in the external world is 
cognized, even in the case of the simplest inorganic substance, it is said 
to be cognized as a synthesis of at least eight elements, the four primary 
elements, earth, water, fire, and wind, and color-shape, odor, taste, 
and tactile sense data. In cases of a thing possessing the organs of 
touch (body), sight, hearing, etc., or again of a thing which emits 
sound, to these eight are added other elements corresponding to the 
respective cases. Quantitative differences in a thing originate from 
qualitative differences of the atoms. The hardness of a certain thing is 
because the power of the earth atoms of that thing is greater than the 
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others. If one mixes cracked barley and salt together and tastes it, only 
the salty taste will be sensed, not the taste of the barley. In the same 
way, it is said that when the atoms of the eight kinds of elements are 
combined, if the strength of the earth atom is greater than that of the 
other atoms, only hardness will be sensed.
As the preceding explanation shows, the Sarvastivadins did not 
think that the characteristics of hardness, dampness, warmth, and 
movement, or color and shape, etc. existed in themselves. What exists 
as a cognizable object is made up of eight elements, and has spatial ex­
tention. Tactile sense data such as hardness, etc. and color-shape, etc. 
represent conceptual abstractions from concretely existing things and 
are elements corresponding to our cognitive organs. In this way, the 
Sarvastivadins reified each of the elements thus abstracted. A concrete 
material object, a jar made from clay for example, if seen by the sight 
organ, is a russet color and has a round shape. If felt by the organ of 
touch, it has a rough, hard feeling. A “jar” is a synthesis of these 
elements. If the jar falls to the floor, it will be smashed, but the color 
and shape, etc. remain. Even when that jar ceases to exist, the same 
color and shape are seen in other jars, and the rough feeling and the 
hardness also continue to exist somewhere else. Color-shape down 
through tactile sense data (i.e., the five elementary objects of the 
cognitive organs) are constant and unchanging, but a concrete material 
object which is a synthesis of those elements is impermanent and no 
more than a temporary entity.
The atom is the limit in the division of the spatial extension of mat­
ter. The quantitative mode of matter is determined by the aggregation 
of atoms, but the qualitative mode is not. If the atoms composing a 
body are many, that body will be large, and if the atoms are few, it will 
be small, but the sensation of hardness exists in both a great boulder 
and a small stone, and white color exists in both a piece of cloth and a 
strand of thread. The Vaisesika considered the atom to be the 
“substance” (dravya), and clearly distinguished it from attributes such 
as color and tactile sense data. In the theory of the Sarvastivadins, both 
substance and attribute are combined. It can be called a mixing of two 
points of view, the epistemological view which analyzes matter into 
separate sense data, and the ontological view which cuts matter off 
from the subject and grasps it as entities having a definite mass. The 
epistemological view is given preference in the Sarvastivadin position, 
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which except for unmanifested form, takes the five organs of cognition 
and their objects as material existence. The atom theory was originally 
not a Sarvflstivadin theory and seems to have been adpoted from the 
Vaigesikas about the time of the MahOvibhOsO. This means that, 
because matter is grasped in terms of its qualitative distinctions by the 
various organs of cognition, the Sarvastivadins recognized qualitative 
distinctions even in the atom which was basically the limit of quan­
titative analysis, thus harmonizing the atom theory with their theory.
Problems in the SarvOstivOdin Theory
Concerning the whole and its parts, there is no intrinsic problem in 
the preceding theoretical position of the Sarvastivadins. The concept of 
the whole and its parts is a general concept concerning the quantitative 
mode of matter. The bowl shape is part of the jar, but the jar’s color 
and tactile sense data are not its parts. If seen from a distance, an army 
composed of many troops, war chariots, elephants, horses, etc., or a 
forest in which all sorts of trees are collected is a single color and a 
single shape.
The view that a thing composed of many elements is only an ap­
pearance and not real runs throughout the Sarvastivadin philosophy. 
There does not exist anywhere the substance of a person corresponding 
to a given name. But the special characteristic of the Sarvastivadin 
theory is that it regards the elements that compose a thing to be what is 
grasped by each organ of cognition, for example, color, shape, tactile 
sense data, etc., and not the parts of the entity as a whole, for example, 
the shaft, axle, etc. of the chariot. The Sarvastivadins are of the opi­
nion that a thing such as a jar or a cloth is a synthesis of various sense 
data and is, therefore, only a temporary entity, but that the sense data 
of color, shape, etc. really exist. Color and shape which are visible by 
virtue of the organ of vision are considered real because they possess 
the capacity to produce visual cognition. Thus, while treating as real 
the product of the analysis into discrete sense data of material entities 
that have the capacity to produce cognition (‘Moors of cognition”), 
the Sarvastivadins also adopt a heterogeneous atom theory that is prob­
lematic for their position. For if color and shape are held to be collec­
tions of their respective atoms, then they cannot be real and will have 
no more than a provisional existence. A unitary atom is not something 
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that can be seen by the organ of vision. It is not a door of cognition. 
The Sarvastivadins seem to have held the inconsistent view that both 
the atom of color and the collection of such atoms are real; it was the 
Sautrantikas who established a thoroughly consistent theory with 
regard to this point.
The Sautrantika Position
The Sautrantika criticized the Sarvastivadins on many points, and in 
the process ended up providing a bridge to Vijfianavadin philosophy. 
In particular the clarification of the distinction between conceptual en­
tities and entities existing objectively in the external world was the 
achievement of this school. A detailed discussion of the Sautrantika 
position on this point appears in the second chapter of the Abhidhar- 
makosa-bhQsya in the form of a criticism of the Sarvastivada. Accord­
ing to the Sautrantika, among the entities the Sarvastivadins held to be 
ultimate elements of existence, the two categories of “things 
dissociated from thought*’ (citta-viprayukta-samskOra) and “uncon­
ditioned things’’ (asamskrta) are not real, but merely concepts; for 
their existence is not known directly by the organs of cognition, as are 
color, sound, etc., nor do they have a clear function, as do the organs 
of vision, hearing, etc.
With regard to material entities (rQpa) as well, the Sautrantika 
clarified the distinction between reality (paramart ha-sat, “ultimate 
reality**) and appearance (prajriapti-sat, “nominal existence” or 
samvrti-sat “empirical reality”) which exists in name only and lacks 
any reality. In doing so they did not, like the Sarvastivadins, consider 
as real what is seen by the organ of vision, such as the blue color or 
round shape', instead, by understanding as real that which has the 
efficacy to produce visual cognition, they sought to resolve the 
difficulties inherent in the Sarvastivadin atom theory. As expressed in 
the Abhidharmakosa-bhOsya (dhatu-nirde§a), the Sautrantika opinion 
is that what is visible to the eye is the collection of atoms; the individual 
atoms are by themselves not seen by the organ of vision, but when col­
lected, each atom becomes the cause of visual cognition. The meaning 
of the Sautrantika assumption that, “the aggregate of atoms is no 
different from the individual atom” should be understood from this 
point of view.
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A real thing must be a unitary thing and possess a single efficacy. The 
thing which is formed from a mutual connection of many elements, 
because it would become non-existent if the elements which had joined 
were separated, is an appearance and unreal. That which is real is the 
ultimate unit reached by carrying analysis to its limit. The 
Sarv&stivadins divided the objects of the organ of vision into colors, 
such as blue, yellow, red, and white, and forms (samsthQna) such as 
long, short, square and round; but the Sautrftntika denied the reality of 
form. Form is something produced by the way in which.color atoms col­
lect and is appearance.
In the Abhidharmakosa-bhOsya (Sryapudgala-nirdeSa) the distinc­
tion between reality and appearance is made as follows: “That thing is 
an appearance if, when broken, the concept connected with it ceases to 
exist, as for example in the case of the jar. Likewise, that thing is an ap­
pearance if the concept of it ceases to exist when the atoms that com­
pose it, such as color, taste, etc., are mentally abstracted out, as for 
example in the case of water. Reality is different from that mode of 
being.”
In other words, if a jar falls to the floor and is smashed, what exists 
are broken pieces, not the jar. If a cloth is unraveled, there are only the 
threads, and nothing called “cloth.” Water cannot be destroyed as a 
jar and cloth can, but because within it exist color, taste, and a cool 
feeling, it is possible to mentally analyze it into it’s various elements. If 
it is analyzed into color atoms, t^te atoms, etc., there will exist 
nothing in addition to these to be called “water.” All such divisible 
things are appearance; only things that cannot be broken up or mental­
ly analyzed into their components are real.
Samghabhadra’s NyOyOnusttra14 quotes exactly this statement of the 
Abhidharmako^a-bhGsya, and makes reference to an Elder who ex­
pressed what amounts to the same view: “When a thing formed from 
many components is said to exist, that existence is appearance. Con­
versely, when a unitary thing is said to exist, that existence is real. 
When an entity is analyzed, if it looses its former name, it is an ap­
pearance. If an entity is analyzed and does not loose its former name, it 
is real.” The person referred to as the Elder in the NyayOnusQra is the 
old Sautrintika teacher, Srllata, who was active in Ayodhyi, and is 
14 Sanghabhadra’s NyOyOnusara exists only in Chinese, T. 1562.
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said to have written the VibhOsd of the Sautrantika.15 16There can be no 
doubt that the distinction between reality and appearance in the 
Abhidharmakota-bhasya is the Sautrantika theory, following in the 
tradition of Srilata.
15 The Vibhasa of the Sautrantika by Srilata is not extant. However, it is referred to 
by Kuei-chi in Ch'eng wei shih lun shu chi (Commentary on the Vijfiaptimatrata-sid- 
dhi), Vol. 4, T. 1830.
16 Dignaga’s • UpOdayaprqjriaptiprakarana exists only in Chinese translation, T. 
1622.
The Concept of Appearance
A work that clarifies the Sautrantika concept of appearance is 
Digndga’s * UpOddyaprajhaptiprakarana^ This work states that the 
Sautrantika considered the “whole” (avayavin), the “continuum” (sa- 
mtana), and “modality” (gvasthabheda) to be appearance.
The Whole: If the whole possesses reality, then it must be either 
different from or the same as the parts which make up the whole. If the 
whole is not considered different from the parts, then each part is re­
spectively the whole; thus we are led to the illogical conclusion that 
each part is the same as the other parts. If the body does not differ from 
the hands and feet, then both the hands and the feet are the body; 
therefore, the hands and the feet turn out to be the same. However, if 
on the other hand we consider each individual part making up the 
whole as differing from it, then a single entity would possess many ex­
istences, and this is also illogical. Thus, if the whole is assumed to be a 
thing possessing reality in itself then it cannot escape contradiction. 
Nevertheless, in man’s daily experience, what is expressed by words 
such as “body,” “forest,” or “army,” are not completely non-exis­
tent; on the basis of such words they are understood as things existing 
as wholes. In other words, the whole is not real, but its existence is 
recognized as appearance, and as such it cannot be said either to be the 
same as or different from the real parts.
The continuum: If the continuum is the same as what exists in each 
moment, then the infancy, childhood, etc. of a given person would 
each be that person’s entire life; and therefore, childhood, youth, 
maturity, etc. would all be the same as infancy. Moreover, because the
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person’s entire life would be lost when separated from childhood, 
human growth could not be admitted. Conversely, if the continuum is 
different from each individual moment, then it would be completely 
meaningless for a person now suffering from a fever to attempt to cure 
it by taking medicine. If we admit reality in the continuum, we are led 
to such contradictions; however we understand a name, such as 
Devadatta, as refering to a single person who exists continuously from 
birth to death. Thus, even though the continuum is not real, in the 
world of daily experience, its existence is tentatively t.aken as real.
Modality: A single material entity, according to differences in view­
point, is grasped and determined in various modes. If it is being viewed 
as being a thing formed from the assembly of numerous atoms, then it 
is determined as being the result of that assembly rather than the cause; 
if juxtaposed to a permanent entity such as space, then it is determined 
as impermanent; if juxtaposed to mind which is invisible and without 
tangibility, it is determined as being a visible and impenetrable entity. 
In this way various determinations are employed, yet the thing ex­
pressed by these determinations is the same material entity. If it is main­
tained that this material entity must be a different thing from its 
variously determined modes, then it would not exist in any of these 
modes; however, if this material entity is taken to be the same as the 
various modes, then, for the same reason explained in the case of the 
whole and the continuum, we invite the illogical conclusion that there 
is absolutely no distinction between modes. Thus, differences of mode 
also do not exist in this sense, and are nothing but appearances based 
on differences in determinations.
That which can be established as the same as or different from a real 
thing must itself be real. The wholes, etc., which cannot be determined 
to be either the same as or different from their real parts, etc., are not 
real. Obviously, the relationship of sameness or difference between ap­
pearances is not thus denied. The body is not real, but to the extent 
that it’s existence as appearance is recognized, to say that A’s body 
differs from B’s is certainly reasonable. However, we cannot consider 
as analogous the body’s similarity to or difference from the hands and 
feet. For, in contrast to the hands and feet, which exist in themselves, 
the body is a temporary construct, having the hands and feet, etc. as its 
material cause (upadana)\ if the material cause is removed, no trace of 
the body would remain. The real cannot be something which loses its
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own being when other things related to it are removed or destroyed. A 
thing which ceases to exist as itself when other elements related to it are 
removed is an appearance.
In the UpadOyaprajHaptiprakarana, Dignaga, while borrowing the 
concept of appearances from the Sautrantika, concludes that all things 
considered as entities in the world of daily experience are appearances, 
and shifts towards VijfiRnavada thought; but that is not the question 
before us.
Vasubandhu’s Criticism of Realism
Now let us return to the VimJatikO. The first of the three kinds of•
realism criticized by Vasubandhu was the Vaisesika theory that the 
whole is separate from the parts. Vasubandhu’s position, which is 
critical of this theory, denying the existence of anything like a unitary 
whole, stands, needless to say, in a philosophical tradition handed 
down from early Buddhism in which human existence is dissected into 
its elemental components, and thus denied any substantiality. But it is 
also possible in particular to see in the background of Vasubandhu’s 
criticism, the Sautrantika theory that the “whole” is an appearance.
The second kind of realism is the Sarvfistivadin atom theory. The 
general nature of that atom theory has already been explained, but the 
problem here is its unique exposition of the manner in which the atoms 
assemble. The Sarvastivadins take the position that when the many 
atoms assemble and become a visible thing, the separate atoms are 
merely in the vicinity of one another, and not touching.
The atom, since it is the limit of the division of the spatial extension 
of matter, has no parts. Accordingly when two atoms touch, it is im­
possible for a part of each to come into contact. However, if the two 
atoms are wholly touching each other, then because they would be com­
pletely overlapping, they would be exactly the same as a single atom. 
Thus, the Sarvastivadins claim that atoms assemble without touching 
each other.
This explanation raises a simple question. If a piece of cloth, for ex­
ample, is taken to be many atoms collected without touching each 
other, and if someone were to take this cloth and shake it, would not 
the collected atoms be scattered about? Why is it that such a thing does
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not actually happen? The Sarvastivadins reply that the element air 
maintains the collected atoms.
Vasubandhu criticizes this Sarvistivadin theory, arguing that since 
the individual atoms are not perceived, even though they collect in 
numbers they will not become the object of cognition.
What would happen, then, if the atom theory is not employed? If we 
return to the original Sarvastivadin position, and regard as the object 
the color, tactile sense data, etc., corresponding to the individual 
organs of cognition, then are not such fallacies as the non-cognition of 
the objects dissolved? However, color and tactile sense data are proper­
ties and not things that can be quantitatively analyzed. Vasubandhu 
points out the failure of the Sarvastivadin theory on this point.
(1) If we see the earth’s surface as the object of the visual organ, 
namely, as rflpa, then it is a single, indivisible thing. Thus, it 
would be impossible to walk the earth’s surface step by step; for, 
if we advance the foot one step, then we should cover all the 
earth’s surface within the bounds of vision.
(2) There would be no situations in which one edge of a piece of cloth 
is grasped and not the other edge. Since the cloth, regarded as 
white, is without parts it would be impossible to grasp one edge 
and not grasp all edges at the same time.
(3) Let us assume that a horse and an elephant are in a certain place. 
In this case, if the place is seen as color, it cannot be divided. 
Thus, because the place of the elephant and the place of the horse 
would be the same, it would be impossible to distinguish between 
the elephant and the horse. Moreover, the space between the 
elephant and horse is occupied by neither, but that empty place 
and the places occupied by the elephant and horse would be the 
same. In other words, there arises the contradiction that in the 
same place animals both exist and do not exist.
(4) There is no quantitative distinction between colors or shapes. As 
white color, there is no difference between a small cloth and a 
large cloth. Accordingly, if we follow the Sarvastivadin theory, 
then for example, because even a microscopic water creature 
would be equivalent to a large thing having the same color and 




Because objects of cognition are analyzed only qualitatively into 
such properties as blue, and green or hard and rough, problems like 
these will arise. Therefore, Vasubandhu says that it is necessary to ex­
amine the atom theory which explains an object’s quantitative distinc­
tions. However, as previously shown there are faults in the Sar­
vastivadin theory in which atoms assemble without mutual contact.
The third kind of realism is the view that the object of cognition is an 
aggregation of numerous atoms without gaps between them. This view 
is presented as the theory of the “Venerable One” (bhadanta) in the 
dhatu-nirdeJa of the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, where Vasubandhu 
comments that “The Venerable One’s theory ought to be accepted.” It 
is not clear who the person called “the Venerable One” is (in one 
theory, it is the Sarvastivadin, Dharmatrata), but this view is close to 
the Sautrantika theory seen in later literature. When we consider the 
fact that YaSomitra, in his commentary to the Abhidharmakosa-bhAs- 
ya contrasted this view with the Sarvastivadin view, and the fact that in 
the Abhidharmako^a-bhQsya, Vasubandhu is often in agreement with 
the Sautrantika theories, it would appear that this atom theory can be 
attributed to the Sautrantika. The Sarvastivadins also held that the 
atoms were adjacent to one another, but not that they adhere to one 
another without intervals. According to YaSomitra’s explanation, they 
say that there is no room for light to enter between the atoms, but think 
that there is enough room for other atoms to enter. However, to think 
that there is space between atoms is to deny the doctrine of the 
impenetrability of matter. Accordingly, the Sautrantika said that there 
is no gap between the collected atoms.
The Vimsatikd criticizes this Sautrantika theory, saying that, since in 
the first place the atoms which are parts of the aggregation cannot be 
established as a simple substance, it is impossible for numerous atoms 
to form an aggregation.
If the atoms are regarded as assembled, then because other atoms 
would be attached at the top, bottom and four sides of a given atom, 
the atom would have six parts. Something that possesses parts ought to 
be further divisible, and is not a simple substance. Conversely, if an 
atom has no parts, a single atom would completely overlap the six 
other atoms it combines with, and thus the entire body composed of an 
aggregation of atoms would be the size of a single atom. Hence, not a 
single thing would be perceived.
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Whether atoms are considered to have spatial parts or not, in either 
case it is impossible to escape an illogical conclusion. Hence, the 
existence of the unitary atoms which form aggregates is not 
demonstrated, and lacking that demonstration, it cannot be claimed 
that aggregates of atoms are the objects of cognition.
Alambana-parTksa (Inquiry into the Object of Cognition)
It is necessary to discuss in further detail the Sautrantika theory, but 
let us delay this briefly. We have seen in general the criticism of the 
three kinds of realism in the Vimfatika. The atom theories of the•
Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantika were also criticized in Dignaga’s 
AlambanapariksO. This small essay of Dignaga makes clear two condi­
tions that must by possessed by the object of cognition, and from this 
point of view carefully inquires into realism.
An object of cognition must satisfy the following two conditions:
(1) It must be the cause which produces the cognition.
(2) It must have the same form as the image.
In order to satisfy the first condition, the object must be real. It 
would be impossible for an unreal thing to trigger the five sense organs 
and give rise to cognition. If even an unreal thing could be the cause of 
the production of visual cognition, then people ought to be able to see 
even rabbit horns.
Moreover, the object must be the factor which limits the content of 
one cognition such that it is different from another; for each cognition 
necessarily possesses a unique content, and is not a generalized cogni­
tion unlimited in content. Furthermore, the object, being the factor 
determining the content of each cognition, must be thought of as hav­
ing the same form as the image which is the content of the cognition. 
For, if a person, while having a round thing as an object, is able to 
have the image of a square thing, then it ought to be possible to have 
even a triangle as the object of that same image, and thus the individu­
ality of cognition would be lost.
If we examine the Sarvastivfldin theory from this point of view, since 
the individual atoms combined without touching each other are real, 
they satisfy the first condition of any object of consciousness. 
However, since atoms do not have the same form as the image, they 
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fail to satisfy the second condition; and hence, the Sarvistividin 
theory cannot be considered correct. If it were simply a matter of the 
first condition of being a cause of cognition, even the individual organs 
of cognition could satisfy it; but no one would consider the organ of 
sight to be the object of visual cognition.
How about, then, the Sautrfintika theory, which makes the ag­
gregate of atoms the object of cognition? Because in the aggregate of 
atoms there is a gross form not visible in the atoms themselves, the sec­
ond condition is satisfied. However, the form in the aggregate is an ap­
pearance, and not something real. As will be explained when we deal 
with the self-cognition of knowledge, this form is something inferred 
from the image. Since an unreal thing fails to satisfy the first condition 
of an object of cognition, the Sautrfcntika theory is also incorrect. No 
one thinks that when the person with bad eyes sees a double moon the 
cause of that image is an unreal double moon.
In the A lamb ana-parties a along with the above two theories a third 
theory not seen in the Vimfatikn is introduced and criticized. This 
theory is attributed to the “New-Sarvastivadin,”17 though there is also 
a view which attributes it to Buddhadeva, and can be seen in San­
ghabhadra’s NyOyQnusara. It takes the opposite view from the Sautran- 
tika, holding that the aggregate of atoms, directly perceived as some­
thing having a certain form, is real; and that the individual atoms, 
which are not directly perceived but whose existence is merely inferred, 
are appearances. The aggregate of atoms, being both real and pos­
sessed of a visible form, is considered to satisfy the two conditions of 
the object of cognition.
17 The “New-Sarvastivadin” is discussed in Kuei-chi*s Weishih erh shih tun shu chi, 
ch. 2, T. 1834.
Digndga criticizes this theory on the basis of the Sautr&ntika doctrine 
of the real and the apparent introduced above. Although differences in 
the contents of separate cognitions are said to derive from differences 
in the form of the jars, plates, etc., which are the objects of these cogni­
tions, still the form of these jars and plates, etc., is only an appearance 
and not real; for when analyzed into the component atoms, the 
knowledge of the forms of the jars and plates, etc., is completely lost. 
In the case of something real, even if one part is removed, the 
knowledge of that thing is not lost. For example, in the case of the 
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white color of a cloth, even if the cloth is cut in half or unraveled into a 
single thread, it is still perceived as a white color. Therefore, color is 
real. The form is the collection of color atoms, and is nothing but ap­
pearance. The atoms themselves are all round, and have no distinction 
as to form. Thus, if the individual atoms are held to be the cause of 
cognition, the cognition of a jar and the cognition of a plate would be 
the same.
2. The Representationalist Theory of Knowledge
The Lamp Illumines Itself
We have seen that in both the VimJatika and AlambanapariksH all 
forms of realism are denied. What, then, ought to be accepted as the 
object of cognition? The answer given here is the Vijfianavada theory 
that it is the form within knowledge itself. In the AlambanaparTksO 
Dignag a says, “The form of an object within knowledge, which ap­
pears to be something external, is the object of cognition.”
To say that the object of cognition is the form within knowledge is to 
say that knowledge cognizes knowledge itself. This notion that self­
cognition is the essence of knowledge is one of the basic theories of the 
Vijfianavada school.
If we light a lamp in a dark room the walls and ceiling, tables and 
chairs, and other objects previously unseen are illumined. But we are 
also able to see the lamp itself; at the same time that the lamp illumines 
objects it also illumines itself. The Vijfianavada school holds that the 
nature of knowledge is similar to that of the lamp.
A metal weight set in one dish of a balance functions to measure the 
weight of a substance in the other dish. But in order to know that exact 
weight of that metal weight it must be weighed by another weight: the 
weight of the metal weight cannot be known by the metal weight itself. 
In other words, a metal weight reveals the weight of other objects, but 
not its own weight. Some schools of thought hold that knowledge has 
the nature, not of the lamp, but of the metal weight.
According to the Samkhya theory, for example, reason (buddhi), 
which possesses the activity of cognition, is something evolved from 
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the material principle (prakrti), and thus is a non-spiritual entity. 
Therefore, while it functions to cognize objects presented to it by the 
sensory and thought organs, it is not conscious of its own function. 
That which knows the function of reason is the purusa, the spiritual 
principle which, like the audience watching a dancing girl on the stage, 
observes everything evolved from the material principle. The Nyiya 
school takes the view that one knowledge is known by another 
knowledge. First, through the contact between sense organ and object 
knowledge arises; but that knowledge is not self-conscious. Subsequent­
ly, knowledge mediated by the thought organ arises; and this 
knowledge knows the first knowledge. After Dignaga, Kumarila Bhatta 
(ca. 600-50) of the Mlmamsa school developed a unique theory. Ac­
cording to him, since cognition is a function, cognition itself is not 
known directly. But since, as a result of the function of cognition, the 
object is known—or as it is said, the character of “cognizedness” 
(Jnatata) occurs in the object—the function of cognition is inferred 
from this cognizedness. Thus, according to Kumarila, the cognitive 
function is known through the inference, “If there had been no 
cognitive function, this object would not have been known (would not 
have possessed ‘cognizedness’).”
In opposition to these schools, the Vijnanavada argued that 
knowledge in so far as it is knowledge must be self-cognizant. When we 
perceive a blue color, we are also simultaneously conscious of that 
cognition. If we did not have this consciousness, we would not know 
that we had perceived a blue color. If the lamp illumined only the ob­
jects and not itself, we would see only the object and not the lamp; and 
therefore we would not know whether the objects appeared of their 
own accord or whether the lamp illumined them. The lamp by il­
luminating itself also reveals the fact that the objects are illumined by 
the lamp. Knowledge, like the lamp, illumines itself, and thereby 
reveals that the object has been illumined by knowledge. This is the 
special characteristic of knowledge which distinguishes it from non-sen- 
tient bodies.
Consequently, that an object is cognized means that within our 
knowledge there exist simultaneously the two factors of the object il­
lumined by knowledge and the knowledge illuminating the object. 
Knowledge always has within itself these two factors. That being the 
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case, the object of knowledge becomes an object internal to 
knowledge—i.e., an object which has already been taken into and 
made a part of knowledge. We know a blue color which we have 
perceived, a blue color within our knowledge, and not a blue color in 
the external world. It was this that Digndga demonstrated in his 
criticism of realism.
Proofs of Self Cognition
The two factors internal to knowledge—the perceived object and its 
cognition—are described respectively as “the form of the object” (ar- 
thakara, visayakara) and “the form of (knowledge) itself’ (svakara), 
or as “the manifestation (of knowledge) as object” (arthobhosa, vi- 
sayObhOsa) and “manifestation as itself* (svabhasa)\ or again, the two 
factors are expressed by the terms, “the grasped aspect” (grahyakara) 
and “the grasping aspect” (grOhakakOra). In Chapter 1 of his Prama- 
nasamuccaya. DignRga offers several proofs for the existence of these 
two factors internal to knowledge. Here let us mention one or two of 
them.
1) It is universally admitted that distinct from a given knowledge of 
an object there is another knowledge which takes that knowledge 
as its object. The knowledge which recollects, for example, that “I 
saw him yesterday” has as its object a knowledge occurring yester­
day which had “him” as its object. If, then, there were not the two 
factors of object and cognition within knowledge there would not 
be this distinction between “knowledge of the object” and 
“knowledge of knowledge of the object.”
If knowledge did not contain within itself the form of the ob­
ject, then knowledge would always appear simply as itself, and 
would lose the particularity of individual knowledges: it would be 
like a lamp with nothing to illumine. The knowledge of an object, 
and the knowledge of that knowledge are both the activity of 
illumination itself, and are identical. If on the other hand, 
knowledge only illumined the object and not itself, then to know 
the object would mean simply that the form of the object is mani­
fest, and we would not know whether the object was made appar­
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ent by knowledge or had appeared by itself. Furthermore, since 
knowledge of the knowledge of the object would only illumine the 
form of the object manifest in this way, even this knowledge 
would only be the manifestation of the same form of the object. 
Consequently, there would not be a distinction between knowledge 
of the object and the secondary knowledge which has that knowl­
edge as its object.
Only when it is recognized that the “form of the object” and the 
“form of knowledge itself’ are both included within knowledge— 
that is, that knowledge has self-cognition as its fundamental 
nature—can we explain the distinction between “knowledge of the 
object” and “knowledge of knowledge of the object.” Since the 
argument here is rather complicated let us symbolize it as follows: 
Cj (knowledge of the object); O| (“form of the object” in CJ; 
Si (“form of itself” in CJ.
C2 (knowledge of knowledge of the object); O2 (“form of the ob­
ject” in CJ; S2 (“form of itself’ in CJ.
If we express the fact that Ci includes within itself both Oj and 
Si by Ci=(Si . OJ, then C2=(S2. OJ. Since C2 has C| as its ob­
ject, O2=(Si . OJ. Therefore, C2=[S2 (SI . OJ], and C2 and Cj 
are clearly different.
In the case where knowledge does not include within itself the 
form of the object, Ci=S|, C2=S2; but S2=Si; therefore, C2=Cj.
In the case where knowledge does not include within itself its 
own manifestation, Cj=O|, C2=O2; but O2=CI=Oi; therefore, 
C2=Ci.
2) Recollection always occurs in reference to a past experience: it is 
impossible to recollect, for example, some animal we have never 
before seen. Now, we recollect not only, say, the pot on the table 
yesterday; we also recollect having seen the pot on the table yester­
day. That is, what is recollected is not only the object, but the 
knowledge of the object as well. This means that yesterday we ex­
perienced the knowledge of the object; or in other words, that 
there occurred yesterday a knowledge which included within itself 
both the object seen and that which saw.
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The Sautrantika Doctrine: DharmakTrti’s Theory
The Sautrantika school also recognized the self-cognition of 
knowledge. This school taught a theory of momentariness (ksanika) in 
which both the external entity and the mind disappear the moment they 
arise. In the moment when knowledge arises, the object in the external 
world has already vanished. Therefore, the external object itself is not 
perceived. What is perceived is the form produced in knowledge by the 
external object. Since in this way knowledge knows the form of the ob­
ject within itself, that cognition is nothing other than the self-cognition 
of knowledge. This is the Sautrantika view. They differ from the Vi- 
jhanavada in admitting the existence of the external world.
If what we perceive is a form internal to knowledge then we cannot 
know whether or not the external object actually exists. The Sautran­
tika recognized the existence of the external object, because they 
thought that the factors limiting cognition spatially and temporally 
must exist outside knowledge itself. The jar seen on this table now is 
not seen everywhere all the time: cognition always occurs in a specific 
time and place. If cognition arose of its own accord without any restric­
tion by external conditions, the time and place in which the jar was 
seen would be quite arbitrary. The reason why the jar is seen only here 
and now is that cognition is limited (or conditioned) by the external ob­
ject. On the basis of this way of thinking, the Sautrantika inferred the 
existence of an external object not directly perceived.
Consequently, according to the Sautrantika the external object is 
essentially the efficacy to give rise to, or cause, knowledge. Dhar- 
makirti says,
If it is asked how it is possible for the external object of the 
preceding moment, being of a different time from the knowledge (of 
that object), to be the object of cognition, the answer is as follows: it 
is recognized by those versed in logic that to be the object of cogni­
tion means nothing but to be the cause able to project into knowl­
edge a form similar to its own form. (Pramilnavarttika, Pratyaksa 
Chapter, 247.)
If we hold that that which exists in the external world as the cause of 
knowledge has a form, then it could not be individual atoms, and must 
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be considered a collection of atoms. But according to the Sautrantika 
theory an aggregate is only an appearance, and in an appearance there 
could be no efficacy to produce knowledge. One solution for this prob­
lem contained in the Sautrantika doctrine of realism was provided by 
Dharmaklrti’s theory.
His argument, presented in the PramOnavOrttika (Pratyaksa 
Chapter, 194-230), is developed against the background of Dignaga’s 
interpretation of one section of the Abhidharmakotia-bhOsya (in 
Pramanasamuccaya, Pratyaksa, 4), and the criticism of that interpreta­
tion by the Jain scholar Mallavadin (mid-sixth c.) (in Dvada&ra- 
Nayacakra, “Twelve-spoked Wheel of Viewpoints”); but there is no 
need here to go into the details of this background. What was at issue 
was the question of whether or not the sight organ could grasp many 
things simultaneously. Dignaga’s view was that to cognize as a whole in 
terms of a characteristic aspect a multiplicity of objects in the visual 
field is different from cognizing that multiplicity individually, and then 
thinking the universal which unites them. Dharmaklrti, following this 
view, argued that the notion that forms are composed of a multiplicity 
of elements was valid only from the point of view of reason, and that in 
visual cognition the various colors decorating the wings of a butterfly 
are grasped in their variety as a single whole.
The same thing can be said of a collection of many atoms. This, 
however, raises the question of how the individual atoms, which can­
not be seen in isolation, can become the object of vision when col­
lected. Dharmaklrti argues that when many atoms collect without inter­
vals between them, they come to have a special character not present 
when they are scattered individually. Palanquin bearers individually do 
not have the strength to carry the palanquin by themselves, but when 
two or four get together each display the ability to carry the palanquin. 
In the same way, atoms, though individually incapable of being the 
cause of visual cognition, when collected, possess a special character 
(atifaya) which is the cause of knowledge. And “to be an object is 
nothing other than to be a cause of knowledge.” (Pratyaksa Chapter, 
224).
In this way, the multiplicity of atoms collected without interstices 
become the object of visual cognition as a unified multiplicity. When a 
multiplicity of atoms are perceived simultaneously the form within
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knowledge is one. Reason which analyzes this form into many images 
caused by the separate atoms, does not function in perception. And 
since there is inferred an external object which throws this form into 
knowledge, this external object, while in reality being a multiplicity of 
atoms is at the same time understood as having a single form.
In this way, the combined multiplicity of atoms, because 1) they are 
the cause giving rise to cognition, and 2) they possess the same form as 
the image, satisfy the conditions for the object of cognition. This is the 
Sautrantika theory worked out by Dharmaklrti.
The Weakness in the Argument for Inferring the External World
The Sautrantika, while beginning from the view that knowledge has 
self-cognition as its essence, at the same time sought to maintain that 
this self-cognition was the cognition of an external object. This was 
because, as we have said, they sought the factors temporally and 
spatially limiting cognition in the external world. If the occurence in a 
specific time and place of knowledge having the form of the object can 
be explained without there being an object in the external world, then 
the grounds for the Sautrantika realism will be insufficient. As we men­
tioned in the beginning, Vasubandhu in his Vimtatikn, using the 
analogy of the dream, argued that the spatial and temporal limitations 
of cognition could be established even where the external object does 
not exist. Just as in the case of the dream, so during our ordinary wak­
ing experience as well the knowledge accompanied by the form of the 
object arises from “a special transformation of the stream of thought” 
(samtati-parinama-vtfesa). Therefore, the Vijfianavada philosophy 
holds that there is no need to posit the existence of an external object. 
This philosophy is a theory of knowledge worked out from the position 
of the practical subject, who realizes that empirical cognition is karma, 
and who seeks to awaken from the dream of empirical cognition to at­
tain a trans-mundane knowledge transcending karma. In this sense, it 
differs qualitatively from the representationalist realism of the Sautran­
tika, whose concern was only with the logical consistency of their 
theory.
The recognition of the existence of the external object as the factor 
limiting cognition spatially and temporally is not only unnecessary; 
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there is clearly a weakness in the Sautrftntika logic, which infers the ex­
ternal object on the basis of the perceptual image. Though the object is 
considered external, its essence is not determined objectively, but is 
said by the Sautrdntika to exist as it is perceived. This, however, leads 
to the contradiction that one entity possesses a multiplicity of essences. 
This problem was pointed out by Dharmaklrti, who showed that even 
in SautrSntika realism what knowledge cognizes is not the external ob­
ject. (PramOnavarttika. Pratyaksa Chapter, 341.) The same point is 
discussed in the MahOyOnasamgraha™ in order to demonstrate the non­
existence of the external world. It is sometimes the case that a number 
of people will have differing images of the same thing. In looking at a 
single red apple, will not the artist’s image differ from that of the or­
dinary man? Although looking at the same river, the ravenous ghosts 
will have an image that is filled with pus, excrement, and urine, while 
the human will receive an image of pure water. If one holds that the es­
sence of the external object is inferred from the image, then this means 
that a single object will be possessed of a multiplicity of essences.
The Cause of Knowledge
In his AlambanaparTksO, Dignaga denies all forms of reality, and 
teaches that the object of cognition is to be understood as nothing 
other than the form of the object within knowledge. From this posi­
tion, DignSga explains several epistemological problems.
Dignaga himself gave two conditions for the object of cognition: 1) 
that it be the cause giving rise to the cognition; and 2) that it possess the 
same form as the image. The form of the object within knowledge ob­
viously fulfills the second condition. But in regard to the first condition 
the opponent objects: “How is it that something which is a part of 
knowledge, and thus arises simultaneously with knowlege, can be a 
cause of knowledge?”
Dignaga gives two kinds of answers to this problem. First, he argues 
that to say that the form of the object is the cause, and the knowledge 
which is aware of the object is the result does not mean that there is tem-
18 The MahQyQnasamgraha is attributed to Asanga and exists in Tibetan (Tohoku 
No. 4048) and Chinese translations (T. 1592-4).
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poral succession between the two; it means, rather, that the two are in a 
relation of necessary connection:
Although it (the form of the object within knowledge) is 
simultaneous with knowledge, because it is in a relation of necessary 
connection with knowledge, it is the cause of knowledge.
A “relation of necessary connection” here means a relationship of 
logical consistency—which is to say, when A exists B exists, and when 
A does not exist B does not exist. When such a relationship holds be­
tween A and B, although A does not temporally precede B, A is con­
sidered the cause of B. For example, the substance is the cause of the at­
tribute; for only when there is the substance does the attribute exist, 
and where there is no substance the attribute does not exist. The rela­
tion of the form of the object within knowledge to the knowledge 
which is aware of that form is precisely such a relationship. This is 
Digniga’s first answer to the opponent.
Of course Dignaga does not deny that in addition to this cause there 
are other causes which bring about the occurence of knowledge. It is an 
established theory of Abhidharma philosophy that the “mind (cilia) 
and mental activities (caitta) arise from four types of causes” 
(Abhidharmakofa-bhQsya, indriya-nirdeSa) and Dignaga accepts this 
view (PramOnasamuccaya, Prat yaks a Chapter). In particular, for any 
thought the immediately preceding thought (samanantara-pratyaya) is 
an important cause. Like the staff on which the man leans his body in 
order to support himself, the form of the object within knowledge is 
the “support” (Olambana-pratyaya) for the thought or knowledge aris­
ing from other causes, and in this sense it is seen as a cause.
As a second answer, Dignaga says that the form of the object within 
knowledge is a cause temporally preceding knowledge. Knowledge is 
momentary; and when one moment of knowledge is extinguished, the 
form of the object of that knowledge leaves its impression in the sub­
conscious. That impression gives rise in the knowledge of the next mo­
ment to a similar form. Therefore, the form of the object in the 
knowledge of the first moment is the same as the form in the knowledge 
of the second moment; and, assisted by the impression left in the sub­
conscious, becomes the cause of the latter.
The question of how something simultaneous with knowledge can be 
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seen as a cause of knowledge was further examined in detail by Dhar- 
makirti. According to him, what is to be considered the primary cause 
of knowledge is not a cause common to any knowledge, but must be 
that element which limits the knowledge as a specific knowledge. The 
reason why a given cognition is a cognition of blue and not of yellow is 
because it possesses some cause other than the sight organ common to 
all cognitions of color. What gives to a knowledge its specificity is 
nothing other than the form of the object appearing in that knowledge. 
Without that form, individual knowledges would all become one. 
Therefore, it is precisely the form of the object within knowledge that 
must be seen as the principal cause of knowledge. In this case the cause 
is understood, not as “the producer” (janaka) of the effect, but as 
“the determiner” (vyavasthOpaka) of the effect.
The Organs of Cognition
A further question is put to Dignaga. According to the doctrine of 
the twelve Hyatanas or the eighteen dhatus taught by the Buddha, 
“visual cognition results from the sight organ (caksur-indriya) and the 
material entity.” But if there is no external material entity, then does it 
not follow that the sight organ as well cannot perform the function of 
producing cognition? To this Dignaga gives the following reply.
As is shown by its name, “indriya” (belonging to Indra), the essence 
of the organs of cognition is efficacy (See Abhidharmakofa-bhasya, in- 
driya-nirde£a). That is, the organs themselves cannot be perceived; 
rather, from the fact of cognition which is a result of their functioning, 
we infer their existence as the efficacy bringing about such cognition. 
Nothing more can be known about the nature of the organs of cogni­
tion. The Sarvastivadins say that they are special transformations of 
the primary elements; there is the view of Buddhadeva that they are the 
elements themselves; and there are also those such as the Samkhya who 
hold that they are transformations most immediately of the sense of 
self (ahamkara) and ultimately of primordial matter (prakrti). But 
these are all dogmatic assertions, and not based on proper inference. 
All that can be inferred is that the organs are the efficacy which results 
in cognition. And, if we suppose that efficacy to be within knowledge 
itself, then there is no necessity for an external entity.
58
REALISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS ONLY
While answering the objections of his opponents, DignSga 
demonstrated that there is within knowledge, on the one hand, the 
form of the object, and on the other, the efficacy to know that form. 
Dignaga’s conclusion, then, is that, although the external object does 
not exist, through the interaction of these two factors there has come 
down from a beginningless past a stream of momentary knowledges.
Sokarajnana-v&da and andkdrajnllna-vada
The view that knowledge contains within itself the form of the object 
is known as sakarajUdna-vada. It cannot be said with certainty when 
this name began to be used, but its earliest appearance is thought to be 
in the MadhyamakOlamkara™ of Santaraksita (ca. 725-88). The name 
is used in opposition to anakOrajnana-vQda, which holds that the form 
belongs to the external object, and that knowledge merely reflects it. 
The Nyiya and Mlmamsa, and within Buddhism schools taking the 
realist position such as SarvSstivSda, consider knowledge to be without 
form (andkara).
The weakness of the anakarajnQna-vada lies in it’s inability to ex­
plain the specificity of individual knowledges. Without the form of the 
object all knowledge would be identical as simply the activity of know­
ing, and could not be distinguished as a cognition, say, of blue or 
yellow. Although it is maintained that the form possessed by the exter­
nal object internally limits knowledge, still as long as it is external it 
cannot limit knowledge. If it is maintained that the form limits 
knowledge at the time it is perceived, then the form of the object 
perceived cannot be said to be external.
The Sautrdntika advocated a realism based on the sakQrajhQna- 
vSda, It may be characterized as a “representationalist realism.” If one 
pursues the sdkOrajnOna-vQda position to its extreme, it leads to the 
Vijfianavada doctrine denying the existence of the external world. 
This theory we have seen in Dignaga’s Alambanapartksa.
The main theme of the Vijfianavada philosophy was not the proof 
that cognition could be established in the absence of an external object. 
They held empirical cognition as a whole to be a dream, and their basic
19 The MadhyamakOlamkara exists only in Tibetan (Tohoku Nos. 3884-3885). 
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concern was with the attainment of a transmundane cognition in which 
one awakes from the dream. Dignaga and Dharmakirti carefully exam­
ine the structure of cognition from the point of view of Vijfianavada, 
and construct subtle epistemological theories, but they almost wholly 
ignore the question of the transcendence of empirical cognition. Their 
Vijfianavada system is called sOkaravijriana-vada, and is contrasted 
with the nirakaravijnOna-vada which emphasizes the “shining mind” 
of one awakened from the dream of empirical cognition.
Translated by William Powell
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